Afghan rules of engagement killing US troops and allowing Taliban to escape
...The US has to bring women to inspect the women encountered by the patrol."Has anyone seen the [Afghan National Army] guys?" asked Capt. Thoreen, 30, the commander of Blackwatch Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment with the 5th Stryker Brigade. "Are they not showing up?"
A soldier, who looked ghostly in the reddish light of a headlamp, shook his head.
"We can't do anything if we don't have the ANA or [the Afghan National Police]," said a frustrated Capt. Thoreen.
"We have to follow the Karzai 12 rules. But the Taliban has no rules," he said. "Our soldiers have to juggle all these rules and regulations and they do it without hesitation despite everything. It's not easy for anyone out here."
"Karzai 12" refers to Afghanistan's newly re-elected president, Hamid Karzai, and a dozen rules set down by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan, to try to keep Afghan civilian casualties to a minimum.
"It's a framework to ensure cultural sensitivity in planning and executing operations," said Capt. Thoreen. "It's set of rules and could be characterized as part of the ROE," he said, referring to the rules of engagement.
Dozens of U.S. soldiers who spoke to The Washington Times during a recent visit to southern Afghanistan said these rules sometimes make a perilous mission even more difficult and dangerous.
Many times, the soldiers said, insurgents have escaped because U.S. forces are enforcing the rules. Meanwhile, they say, the toll of U.S. dead and injured is mounting.
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The Times compiled an informal list of the new rules from interviews with U.S. forces. Among them:
c No night or surprise searches.
c Villagers have to be warned prior to searches.
c ANA or ANP must accompany U.S. units on searches.
c U.S. soldiers may not fire at the enemy unless the enemy is preparing to fire first.
c U.S. forces cannot engage the enemy if civilians are present.
c Only women can search women.
c Troops can fire at an insurgent if they catch him placing an IED but not if insurgents are walking away from an area where explosives have been laid.
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Finally, a small ragtag group of Afghan police arrived to accompany the Americans. The Afghan army was a no-show.
The police, some of whom who looked as young as 13 in their oversized uniforms, have a poor reputation in the local Maywand district for corruption and extortion.
"I'm guessing it was too early for the Afghan National Army to get up out of bed and help us out," Capt. Thoreen said. "They're probably still asleep. Unbelievable."
"Is everyone accounted for?" he asked. "Let's move - stagger your positions."
As the sun revealed the Red Mountain of Maywand, the soldiers headed out the gate of combat outpost Rath with weapons ready.
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Sara Carter has much more about the patrol.
I think there has to be a better way with dealing with Taliban propaganda and use of human shields than the 12 rules that give significant advantages to the enemy and endanger our forces. We have never really had an effective information operation to deal with the enemy's information ops. We are constantly letting them get inside our OODA loop when it comes to information operations. The enemy's best antiaircraft weapon is a press release about bombing a wedding party.
Also see Hershel Smith's comments on this story.
...Making our troops less safe is not the best way to counter Taliban information operations. We need to attack those information ops head on instead of indirectly through restraining kinetic operations.
But the difference is that while the the U.S. Marines in Anbar were remarkably successful, they were under no such rules as we see in Afghanistan. They didn’t cede their authority to Iraqi Security Forces or even the local Iraqi Police, night time searches, seizures and census taking were an ordinary expectation, and there was no warning prior to raids and other kinetic operations so that the enemy could prepare his exit.
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