Strategic realities in Israel

Opinion Journal:

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Though the analogy isn't perfect, in some sense this Hamas exercise can be understood as Israel's version of the U.S.-Iraqi "surge" in Iraq. The year 2006 was the worst in more than a generation for Western interests in the Middle East, with al Qaeda and Iran's proxies advancing in Iraq, Hezbollah fighting Israel to a draw in Lebanon, and Hamas rising in Palestine. The 2007-2008 surge reclaimed the advantage in Iraq, and now Israel is attempting to do the same against Hamas.

The strategic question is larger than merely stopping Hamas missiles from landing in Israeli cities, though that is justification enough for Israel's bombing and the ground operation. A nation like Israel, with enemies on all sides, must maintain an aura of invincibility if it is to have any chance at peaceful co-existence. It was that aura after two wars that induced Egypt to agree to peace with Israel in the 1970s. By contrast, the 2006 Lebanon campaign convinced radical Arabs and Persians that Israel had grown soft and could be beaten. Israel can't let Hamas maintain a similar mythology at the end of this operation, or the costs will be far higher down the road.

Israeli leaders are talking as if they realize this strategic reality, though it's hard to know for sure because their war aims remain publicly ill-defined. Haim Ramon, the Israeli vice premier, says the goal is nothing short of the elimination of Hamas rule in Gaza, though that hasn't been repeated by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert or other senior war leaders. Defense Minister Ehud Barak has said the operation "won't be easy or short," though understandably without much elaboration given the need to keep Hamas in the dark.

We don't agree with those who claim that Israel faces only two bad options: either a limited campaign that scores a tactical victory while allowing Hamas to survive as a military force; or a return to the full-scale occupation that Israel abandoned in 2005. Israel could re-occupy some parts of Gaza, this time without Israeli settlements to defend. More realistically, given Israel's domestic reluctance for such a presence, it could fight long enough to eliminate Hamas as a military threat, then announce a policy that every rocket fired at Israel in the future would be met by a "proportionate" airstrike or other reprisal. This would allow Israel to claim military victory in the short term, while creating a deterrent going forward.

The costs of either operation will be high. But the costs of inaction since Israel abandoned Gaza in 2005 have also been high, especially in allowing Hamas to build an army of some 15,000 men. Hamas now has missiles that can hit targets 20 miles inside Israel, leaving the entire south of the country vulnerable, and on present course longer-range missiles will eventually hit Tel Aviv. Whether or not Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is willing to reassert control of Gaza, Hamas has to be destroyed as a military force.

For the broader Middle East, the issue is the expansion of Iranian influence and terror. Like Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Sadrist "special groups" in Iraq, Hamas has become part of Tehran's bid for regional hegemony. The Bush Administration's regional setbacks in 2006 went far to encourage that Iranian ambition, though the surge has contained it in Iraq. Hezbollah remains stronger than ever in Lebanon, however, and Hamas has been pressing to humble Israel with an eye to deposing Mr. Abbas's Palestinian Authority on the West Bank as it has in Gaza.

This is where Mr. Obama comes in. The Bush Administration has rightly given Israel the diplomatic cover it needs to pursue its war aims, amid the usual Arab, European and U.N. denunciations. Similar denunciations were of course never aimed at Hamas missiles fired at Israeli civilians. As Israel's operation continues, the clamor will build for the U.S. to force Israel to stop short of defeating Hamas. Such an intervention by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice allowed Hezbollah to claim victory in 2006, and Mr. Obama should not repeat the same mistake.

Much as Mr. Obama takes office in a stronger position thanks to the Iraq surge, his foreign policy would also benefit from Israeli success in Gaza. The President-elect says he intends to pursue a grand bargain with Iran, and the mullahs are going to be more interested in diplomacy if their military proxies have been defeated. A Hamas humiliation would also show Tehran that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's regional militarism has more costs than benefits.

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The most irrational idea on the table today is a unilateral cease fire by Israel that has been proposed by Middle East leaders and some Euroweenies. Such a move would be a strategic defeat for Israel and a real win for the Hamas death cult. While the world would be a better place if the Hamas death cult was destroyed, Israel has not set that as a stated objective in order to give itself cover to settle for something less if it is in its interest.

The UN as usual is behind the irrational unilateral cease fire by Israel although it also calls for one by Hamas, even though Hamas has never really honored the cease fire agreement that it recently decided to not renew.

What is really missing from these proposals is a real sense of understanding how immoral Hamas has been in waging war. It is one of the few entities in the world whose primary objective is increasing noncombatant deaths on both sides. It glories in the death of its own noncombatants which it deliberately puts in harms way in violation of the Geneva Conventions. It deliberately targets Israeli noncombatants. This is not small thing and any one who marches on behalf of Hamas in a so called "peace demonstration" is supporting on going war crimes and is helping the criminals to get away with the crimes.

Destroying the RICO equivalent of war criminals should be the objective of all civilized people.