Addressing the force to space issue in Afghanistan

Dexter Filkins, NY Times:

The Taliban are everywhere the soldiers are not, the saying goes in the southern part of the country.

And that is a lot of places.

For starters, there is the 550 miles of border with Pakistan, where the Taliban’s busiest infiltration routes lie.

“We’re not there,” said Brig. Gen. John W. Nicholson, the deputy commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan. “The borders are wide open.”

Then there is the 100-mile stretch of Helmand River running south from the town of Garmser, where the Taliban and their money crop, poppy, bloom in isolation.

“No one,” General Nicholson said, pointing to the area on the map.

Then there is Nimroz Province, all of it, which borders Iran. No troops there. And the Ghorak district northwest of Kandahar, which officers refer to as the “jet stream” for the Taliban fighters who flow through.

Ditto the districts of Shah Wali Kot, Kharkrez and Nesh, where the presence of NATO troops is minimal or nil.

“We don’t have enough forces to secure the population,” General Nicholson said.

The general is going to get a lot more troops very soon. American commanders in southern Afghanistan have been told to make plans to accept nearly all of the 20,000 to 30,000 additional troops that the Obama administration has agreed to deploy.

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While the American-led coalition holds the cities and highways, it appears to have ceded much of the countryside to the Taliban, because it lacks sufficient forces to confront them.

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American commanders say the open borders allow the opium to move unimpeded into Pakistan and other places, and for weapons and other supplies to flow in. Five of the six busiest Taliban infiltration routes are in the south, American officers said.

“Drugs out,” one American officer said, “guns in.”

...

But whether extra troops will have the desired impact is unclear. Adding 20,000 new troops to the 20,000 Western soldiers already here — in addition to an equal number of Afghan policemen and army personnel — would bring the total to 60,000. The six provinces that make up southern Afghanistan have a population of 3.2 million. In that case, the ratio of troops to population would just match that recommended by the United States Army’s counterinsurgency manual: 50 people per soldier or police officer.

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There is much more.

Filkens is one of the best war reporters in the field right now. He has focused on one of the key problems with the Abizaid strategy of economy of force that has impacted our operations in Afghanistan and turned it into a stalemate.

While the 50 people per soldier or police officer, is a rough estimate of troop strength needed, I think the more important ration is force to space. If you have an adequate force to space ratio you control the space and the movement therein. The way you defeat an enemy like the Taliban is stop their movement to contact. When they are on the move is when insurgents are most vulnerable.

If you can protect the people and gain their confidence they can also tell you when the enemy is moving and where he is going. Since the people are the booty in this type of war, you don't need to be chasing the enemy and playing whack-a-mole, because the enemy will come to you.