Pak tribal areas infested with al Qaeda
NY Times:
It confirms in more detail much of what Bill Roggio and I has been saying about the tribal areas for months. One thing that should be clear is that dithering hand wringing is not the answer. There should be attacks on these compounds by both air and ground units with Pakistani troops in a blocking position to catch the fleeing enemy. These attacks should take place as soon as units are in place to execute them.
Pakistan understood this after 9-11 and they should recognize that their situation does not improve with delay in the attacks. Those who would respond against the government for joining in the attacks are confessing their cooperation with our mutual enemy--al Qaeda.
Strategy Page discusses the Paks' dilemma. "... Officers have already reported that up to a third of their troops might be "unreliable" if there were sustained military operations in the tribal territory...." That is why they need our help in destroying these bases.
The Counterterrorism Blog reports that the NY Times article actually understates the training camps when you throw the Taliban camps into the mix.
Senior leaders of Al Qaeda operating from Pakistan have re-established significant control over their once battered worldwide terror network and over the past year have set up a band of training camps in the tribal regions near the Afghan border, according to American intelligence and counterterrorism officials.There is more.
American officials said there was mounting evidence that Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, had been steadily building an operations hub in the mountainous Pakistani tribal area of North Waziristan. Until recently, the Bush administration had described Mr. bin Laden and Mr. Zawahri as detached from their followers and cut off from operational control of Al Qaeda.
The United States has also identified several new Qaeda compounds in North Waziristan, including one that officials said might be training operatives for strikes against targets beyond Afghanistan.
American analysts said recent intelligence showed that the compounds functioned under a loose command structure and were operated by groups of Arab, Pakistani and Afghan militants allied with Al Qaeda. They receive guidance from their commanders and Mr. Zawahri, the analysts said. Mr. bin Laden, who has long played less of an operational role, appears to have little direct involvement.
Officials said the training camps had yet to reach the size and level of sophistication of the Qaeda camps established in Afghanistan under Taliban rule. But groups of 10 to 20 men are being trained at the camps, the officials said, and the Qaeda infrastructure in the region is gradually becoming more mature.
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The concern about a resurgent Al Qaeda has been the subject of intensive discussion at high levels of the Bush administration, the officials said, and has reignited debate about how to address Pakistan’s role as a haven for militants without undermining the government of Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani president.
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But debates within the administration about how best to deal with the threat have yet to yield any good solutions, officials in Washington said. One counterterrorism official said that some within the Pentagon were advocating American strikes against the camps, but that others argued that any raids could result in civilian casualties. And State Department officials say increased American pressure could undermine President Musharraf’s military-led government.
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It confirms in more detail much of what Bill Roggio and I has been saying about the tribal areas for months. One thing that should be clear is that dithering hand wringing is not the answer. There should be attacks on these compounds by both air and ground units with Pakistani troops in a blocking position to catch the fleeing enemy. These attacks should take place as soon as units are in place to execute them.
Pakistan understood this after 9-11 and they should recognize that their situation does not improve with delay in the attacks. Those who would respond against the government for joining in the attacks are confessing their cooperation with our mutual enemy--al Qaeda.
Strategy Page discusses the Paks' dilemma. "... Officers have already reported that up to a third of their troops might be "unreliable" if there were sustained military operations in the tribal territory...." That is why they need our help in destroying these bases.
The Counterterrorism Blog reports that the NY Times article actually understates the training camps when you throw the Taliban camps into the mix.
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