Should Republicans go ahead and add Supreme Court Justices to head off Democrats

Faluja

Jackson Diehl:

Two and a half years ago this week, the Israeli army launched an offensive against the Palestinian towns of Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Bethlehem -- which, it said, had become havens for extremist groups and suicide bombers who made daily life in Israel unbearable. Images of flattened houses and civilian casualties soon filled the world's television screens: Palestinian spokesmen claimed, falsely, that thousands were being massacred. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan declared himself "appalled." President Bush publicly called on Israel to withdraw "without delay." Some editorial writers -- such as this one -- argued that the offensive would do more harm than good.

As Americans and Iraqis now debate what to do about insurgent-held Iraqi towns, it's worth revisiting that Israeli campaign -- because what followed offers a counter to some of the conventional wisdom. Yes, there are innumerable differences between the West Bank and Iraq. And yet the salient point is that through the robust use of military force, Israel has succeeded in reducing the level of violence it faces by more than 70 percent.

Despite occasional feints at diplomacy, the strategy pursued by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has been unadulterated. Israeli forces have invaded and swept Palestinian towns and refugee camps repeatedly. They have carried out hundreds of "targeted killings" of suspected militants, often through air strikes. They have assassinated the Islamic clerics and political leaders who inspired the bombers. Not only has this relentless warfare not been leavened with reconstruction projects or a nation-building program, but Sharon has done his best to destroy existing Palestinian political and governmental institutions.

Yet it's now undeniable that the "military solution" that so many believed could not work has brought Israelis an interlude of relative peace. In 2002, 228 Israelis died in 42 suicide bombings; in March 2002, as Sharon launched his offensive, 85 died in nine attacks. This year there have been 10 suicide bombings and 53 Israeli deaths; last week's bombing in Jerusalem was only the second such bombing in more than six months. While the prospects for an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement remain dismal, and no one expects the violence to end, life in Israel has returned to something approaching normal.

The cost in lives has been lower than commonly believed. For example, in the invasion of Jenin's refugee camp, Israel wiped out the leadership and infrastructure of terrorist organizations responsible for more than two dozen suicide bombings. But human rights groups later documented only 52 Palestinian deaths, of which 22 were civilians. Twenty-three Israeli soldiers died. Since 2002, Palestinian deaths have declined along with those of Israelis. The uproar over the offensive, and what has followed it, has seriously eroded Israel's standing in Europe and elsewhere. But the consequences of that loss are mostly intangible.

So should the U.S. Army stop worrying about the collateral damage of an invasion of Fallujah? Of course not: The United States, after all, is still primarily focused on political goals in Iraq and not merely an end to car bombings. Yet the Israeli experience does suggest that it's wrong to insist, as many in Washington do, that a military campaign against the terrorists' bases could not substantially improve security conditions for both Americans and Iraqis. The visuals would be awful and the outcry loud, on al-Jazeera and maybe at the United Nations. But if the reality were modest civilian casualties and heavy enemy losses, the result might be an opportunity to pursue the nation-building that now is stymied.

The Marines have shown that they can take Faluja with a minimum of friendly casualties. Experience has shown that the aggressive use of force actually saves lives on both sides by shortening the conflict. The delay in subjugating the insurgents in Faluja has cost hundreds of Iraqi lives in bombings of polic stations and other public areas. While the delay may have been the results of Iraqi leaders attempting to avoid killing, it has had the opposite result.

Faluja is the hole in Kerry's doughnut

Fred Barnes:

JOHN Kerry's new policy on Iraq is like a doughnut: It has a big hole in the middle. The Kerry four-point plan calls for recruiting more allies to help in Iraq, accelerating the training of Iraqi soldiers, pushing ahead on reconstruction, and guaranteeing a national election by next January. All that's fine. But none of it can happen unless the terrorists who've made the Iraqi city of Fallujah their sanctuary and staging point for attacks and bombings are defeated. And Kerry has no plan for dealing with the terrorists.

Fallujah is the hole in Kerry's doughnut.

In fact, the f-word — Fallujah — was mentioned only once in Kerry's speech Monday outlining his Iraq strategy. He identified the city as a breeding ground "for terrorists who are free to plot and launch attacks against our soldiers." Indeed, it is exactly that.

But then he went on to lay out his new plan without offering a scheme for subduing Fallujah. He simply assumed, tacitly, that the single biggest problem in Iraq had been solved. Otherwise, his proposal for "high visibility, quick impact" reconstruction projects, for example, makes no sense. It couldn't happen unless Fallujah had been vanquished.

Of course, it's not just Fallujah that's a problem now. A few other cities in the Sunni Triangle north and west of Baghdad are dominated by terrorists, too. Kerry has no plan for overcoming them, either.

Fallujah has been the greatest impediment to progress in Iraq since Saddam Hussein was toppled in April 2003. American Marines had nearly conquered the city last April when they were called off.

...

There are two basic strategies for conquering Fallujah and capturing or killing the terrorists. The one being followed by the U.S. military today is to squeeze the city gradually, reducing the area controlled by the terrorists. By the end of the year, American forces are expected to stage a final effort to seize the city.

The other strategy, favored by Sen. John McCain, is to take Fallujah by attacking it forcefully, the sooner the better. This might be bloody, but, according to that strategy, the price would be worth paying in the long run.

The McCain solution will ultimately save lives and hasten stability.