Democracy in Iraq
NOAH FELDMAN:
"...Mr. Bush was right to refuse a rushed transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government as the price to pay for greater international participation in the postwar effort. The reconstruction of Iraq is a two-track process: one track for security, one for politics. The problems on the security track will not be overcome simply by bringing in more soldiers, American or otherwise. Meanwhile, the political track has been going much better than critics admit — but it could be derailed if the coalition fails to help Iraqis achieve security before turning things over to an Iraqi government that can actually rule the country. To depart from our present course probably wouldn't help — and it could do real harm.
"First, security. Instability in Iraq is not as broad-based as many fear. Essentially all of Iraq's Shiite Muslims and Kurds, who between them make up 80 percent of the population, were happy to see Saddam Hussein go and have made it clear that they want the coalition to remain long enough to prevent the Baath party from re-emerging.
"Thus the main internal threat comes from Sunni Arabs, who have long held power despite being only about 15 percent of the population. Yet even if many of these Sunnis want the coalition out, only a few seem so far to be willing to take up arms — otherwise we would be seeing thousands of incidents each week rather than a handful. Perhaps the greatest concern is the possibility that some attacks have been initiated by terrorists controlled by Iran or Al Qaeda who have infiltrated Iraq's essentially unguarded borders."
"...As for French and German suggestions that we speed up the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government, it would be just as unlikely to aid security. The violence is not coming from people who would be sympathetic to any such interim government. Worse, unless the police and military have been truly reconstituted, an interim body would be a travesty of a sovereign government. Actual control is the indispensable hallmark of sovereignty. Nothing could be worse for the future of democracy in Iraq than the creation of a puppet government unable to keep the peace."
NOAH FELDMAN:
"...Mr. Bush was right to refuse a rushed transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government as the price to pay for greater international participation in the postwar effort. The reconstruction of Iraq is a two-track process: one track for security, one for politics. The problems on the security track will not be overcome simply by bringing in more soldiers, American or otherwise. Meanwhile, the political track has been going much better than critics admit — but it could be derailed if the coalition fails to help Iraqis achieve security before turning things over to an Iraqi government that can actually rule the country. To depart from our present course probably wouldn't help — and it could do real harm.
"First, security. Instability in Iraq is not as broad-based as many fear. Essentially all of Iraq's Shiite Muslims and Kurds, who between them make up 80 percent of the population, were happy to see Saddam Hussein go and have made it clear that they want the coalition to remain long enough to prevent the Baath party from re-emerging.
"Thus the main internal threat comes from Sunni Arabs, who have long held power despite being only about 15 percent of the population. Yet even if many of these Sunnis want the coalition out, only a few seem so far to be willing to take up arms — otherwise we would be seeing thousands of incidents each week rather than a handful. Perhaps the greatest concern is the possibility that some attacks have been initiated by terrorists controlled by Iran or Al Qaeda who have infiltrated Iraq's essentially unguarded borders."
"...As for French and German suggestions that we speed up the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi interim government, it would be just as unlikely to aid security. The violence is not coming from people who would be sympathetic to any such interim government. Worse, unless the police and military have been truly reconstituted, an interim body would be a travesty of a sovereign government. Actual control is the indispensable hallmark of sovereignty. Nothing could be worse for the future of democracy in Iraq than the creation of a puppet government unable to keep the peace."
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