The Russian retreat from Ukraine

 Streiff:

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As I’ve pointed out many times, the Russians attempt to do too much with too few assets. This diffusion of effort results in their inability to muster overwhelming force at the critical point on the battlefield. Even now, with Russia on the glideslope to technical and numerical inferiority, we see four separate operations underway.

There is one operation centered on Kharkiv, one on northern Donbas, a third on southern Donbas, a fourth around Kherson, and politicians pushing for a fifth campaign to take Odesa and create a land bridge that connects Russia to Donbas, Crimea, Odesa, and the Transnistria region of Moldova (Putin Decides to Widen the War With Ukraine to Achieve His Objectives). At most, two of these campaigns actually support one another. Some of these campaigns are critical (Ukraine’s Future Depends on These Three Fights That Russia Must Win), and some are sideshows, but the point is that only one campaign should be ongoing.

Everything else takes assets that could be used for the main effort and grinding them down. The concept of the “tyranny of numbers” doesn’t just apply to computers. Russia started the war with about 120 battalion tactical groups (BTGs).

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At full strength, a BTG will have about 600-800 men. There is a growing body of evidence that Russian BTGs did not enter the war at full strength, and they are at less than full strength now. Moreover, only about 100 BTGs still exist. If you divide them up to carry out five different campaigns, no one has the strength to do anything.

The campaign around Kharkiv had no purpose other than to tie down some number of Ukrainian units at the cost of tying down a larger number of Russian units. There was never any danger the Russian force could generate the combat power to take a major city, and the perimeter the Russians held required many more troops than needed by the defenders. After the Battle of Kiev, Ukraine’s actions show that it does not intend to physically invade Russia (though it might use air, missile, and special forces strikes against key assets). A smart move would be for Russia to abandon the operation directed at Kharkiv, reconstitute those units, and feed them into the Donbas campaign where they could make a difference.

The other possibility is that we’re seeing the leading edge of a loss of will on the part of the Russian Army. There have been multiple reports of combat refusals and unauthorized retreats.

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Should this movement by the Russians continue, Ukraine will clear Russian troops from all of Ukraine, save Donbas, in the next week or so. What does it mean?

Suppose it is a deliberate decision to abandon a dead-end operation and use those troops to greater effect in Donbas. In that case, it will signal that Russia’s war aims have been reduced to annexing Donbas (see Russia Is Creating Facts on the Ground to Support Annexing Eastern Ukraine). Moreover, the tactical withdrawal from around Kharkiv would return to Ukrainian control territory, not within the boundaries of Donetsk Oblast, and provide Moscow with a bargaining chip in any negotiations.

On the other hand, if it is a morale collapse like that experience by the German Army in 1918, this problem is not going to get better. In the next month, we should see it happen again, perhaps serially, as units that have been in heavy combat for nearly 90 days and are now feeling the brunt of Western European weaponry decide they have had enough fun and start making their own decisions.

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 It appears the Russian command continues to underestimate the Ukrainian resistance despite the recent failures of the Russians.  It would not surprise me if Russian troops start establishing defensive positions inside Russia.  Were it not for Putin's ego they probably already would be doing that.