Report on the defense of Combat Outpost Keating

NY Times:

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The base, Combat Outpost Keating in the Kamdesh District of Nuristan Province, was attacked by Taliban forces on Oct. 3. Because the outpost was located in a deep bowl surrounded by high ground, the attackers were able to pin down defenders and prevent them from using mortars to repel the initial attack. In addition, air support was at least 45 minutes away. A second, smaller outpost nearby was also struck by the attackers.

The Taliban quickly overran the base, entering the perimeter through a latrine area, setting fires that burned down most of the barracks, and managing to kill the 8 soldiers and wound 22. The casualties numbered half of the approximately 60 defenders from Troop B of the Third Squadron, 61st Cavalry.

“The investigation concluded that critical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets which had been supporting C.O.P. Keating had been diverted to assist ongoing intense combat operations in other areas, that intelligence assessments had become desensitized to reports of massing enemy formations by previous reports that had proved false, and needed force protection improvements were not made because of the imminent closure of the outpost,” the report said. “These factors resulted in an attractive target for enemy fighters.”

The military’s account of the report, issued in a news release on Friday, suggested that any sanctions should be issued against higher-level officers, although it did not specify details. “Soldiers and junior leaders fought heroically in repelling an enemy force five times their size,” the statement said.

“The report also recommended administrative actions for some members of the chain of command to improve command oversight,” the statement said.

Troop B’s defenders “heroically repelled a complex attack from an enemy force of 300, killing approximately 150 enemy fighters,” according to the statement. “Members of B Troop upheld the highest standards of warrior ethics and professionalism and distinguished themselves with conspicuous gallantry, courage and bravery under the heavy enemy fire that surrounded them.”

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“There were inadequate measures taken by the chain of command, resulting in an attractive target for enemy fighters,” the summary said. It also criticized the Afghan National Army soldiers who had responsibility for guarding the eastern side of the compound but failed to hold their positions. In all, the enemy forces penetrated Combat Outpost Keating at three positions. They also overran a nearby Afghan National Police post.

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Close air support saved the day as it often does in Afghanistan.

It was clearly a mistake to put these troops in this position without adequate support and without much of a mission. However, the commanders on the ground reliance on Afghan troops was also clearly misplaced. They proved to be the weak point that actually permitted parts of the base to be overrun. I think the local commander should also have had better listening posts on the avenues of attack to warn them that the enemy was coming.

It is hard to call this fight a victory for the Taliban who lost half their force as KIAs, but it is reasonable to criticize the decision to put these troops in the position that led to the attack.

The Washington Post has a story that covers the accountability issue on combat beyond just that at Wanat.