Hand wringing over Sri Lanka victory begins

Times:

It was supposed to be the unwinnable war. For almost three decades, Sri Lanka was held up as an example of how a small democratic state with a conventional army could never defeat a well-funded and disciplined guerrilla organisation.

It has proved that to be untrue. But how Sri Lanka won its victory — and whether it should be condoned or copied — is the subject of an international debate that touches on the War on Terror, the UN and the new geopolitical world order.

Opinion is divided about whether Sri Lanka will win the peace by offering its 2.4 million ethnic Tamils an acceptable devolution package.

Whichever side one takes though, Sri Lanka offers valuable lessons for any country facing an insurgency — such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.

From a military perspective the campaign of the past two years has been such a success that it is being studied by counter-insurgency specialists around the world.

Key to that was the acquisition of fighter jets and radar from China and aerial surveillance drones from Israel that allowed the air force to target the Tigers accurately.

The army used guerrilla tactics — moving in small groups through the jungle rather than on main roads — while the Tigers fought a conventional campaign to defend their territory.

Military intelligence split the Tigers by persuading Colonel Karuna, their second in command, to defect in 2004, allowing the army to drive the rebels out of eastern Sri Lanka in 2007. The navy played a crucial role by attacking the Tigers’ supply ships, with help from India and the US.

In the international arena Sri Lanka outmanoeuvred the Tamil Tigers by taking advantage of counter-terrorism legislation introduced after the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001.

It lobbied hard to have the Tigers banned as terrorists in the US, EU, Canada and Australia, forcing those countries to crack down on their financing and arms procurement.

More recently it has cultivated ties with China, Iran and other non-Western powers to counterbalance Western criticism of its conduct of the war.

It also secured tacit approval for its campaign from the ruling Congress party in India, whose leader Sonia Gandhi was keen to avenge the assassination of her husband, Rajiv, by the Tigers in 1991.

The result has been paralysis of the UN system, with Western governments unable to put Sri Lanka on the formal agenda of the Security Council.

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That last paragraph probably is one of the best explanations of the Sri Lanka victory. The UN and the diplomats have extended conflict by trying to force reconciliation efforts instead of allowing one side to win. That has what they have done in Israel and by doing so have kept the Palestinians in a permanent state of dependency. Allowing an Israeli victory would be a much more humane solution. The Palestinians could move one with their lives without the vain hope that they could somehow defeat the Israelis and reclaim what was never theirs to begin with.

World War II and the second Gulf war were the results of imperfect peace agreements. It will surprise some to know that the Roosevelt administration thought the the World War I armistice was too easy on the Germans and for that reason they were determined to be more harsh at the end of World War II. In fact they were almost starving the West Germans until the Soviet blockade started the Berlin airlift which barely kept the Germans alive, but solidified their oppositions to the Soviets and their appreciation of the US.

The complete defeat of the Tigers is more likely to produce a lasting peace than any interference by the UN.