Al Qaeda in decline

Stephen Fidler:

Exhibit one in the case is al-Qaeda’s recent failure to mount successful attacks on western targets. The group has not lost the ability to launch such attacks. On the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and in parts of the Middle East, it also remains potent. But unless it shows the capacity to sustain a tempo of attacks on western targets or demonstrates a capability with biological or nuclear weapons, it is hard to describe it as the strategic threat that it was once widely thought to constitute.

“We know that al-Qaeda has demonstrated weakness because there has not been an attack on the US for 6½ years. That is a fact – so the threat must be kept in context,” says Michael Sheehan, former deputy commissioner responsible for counter­terrorism at the New York City Police Department. “There could be an attack tomorrow, but an attack every 6½ years in the US does not constitute a strategic threat ... They need to get a WMD or sustain conventional attacks to constitute a true strategic threat to the US, although they remain a regional problem in Pakistan-Afghanistan and Iraq.”

This assessment is supported by a little-noticed reference in the UK’s new national security strategy, published in March: “While terrorism represents a threat to all our communities and an attack on our way of life, it does not at present amount to a strategic threat. But it is qualitatively and quantitatively more serious than terrorist threats we have faced in the past, and it is likely to persist for many years.”

Mr Sheehan, author of Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism Without Terrorizing Ourselves, says al-Qaeda’s success depends on provoking a disproportionate reaction from its targets. “Terrorism is an instrument of the weak and al-Qaeda is dependent on a psychological overreaction from the west and particularly the US ... Al-Qaeda is weakened but it is still dangerous because of its unrestrained intent to kill in large numbers.”

Peter Clarke, a former head of the Metropolitan Police’s anti-terrorism branch, told a conference organised by the New York University Law School in Florence that there had been “a pause” in successful al-Qaeda-directed terrorist operations in the UK. He said the group had taken “a bit of a blow” from more than 60 terrorism convictions in Britain, in many of which he said the defendants had no alternative but to plead guilty.

Al-Qaeda has suffered some key losses in recent months – the second exhibit in the argument that it is in decline. Three important commanders have been killed in the Pakistani tribal territories where its headquarters operation is based, two of them reportedly to attacks from US unmanned aerial vehicles. The three were significant figures and their loss, coming so close together, is likely to be a blow.

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This “self-seeding” phenomenon was once regarded as the ultimate nightmare. If plotters were not linked to al-Qaeda’s hierarchy, how would security agencies stand a chance of finding them? This view has softened over time, however, since the self-seeded cells appear in the main to be far less capable than those trained by al-Qaeda’s experts.

Part of the reason for this may be the limitations of the internet. As an instrument for radicalisation and for communication, the web is peerless. But as a training tool, it has proved much less useful. It is true that bomb-making and other terrorist techniques can be found on the internet, but many of these instructions are unreliable or incomplete. It was al-Qaeda training in Pakistan of at least two of the July 7 bombers that appears to have made the group more lethal.

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The setbacks have fallen into three interlinked categories: operational, ideological and popular.

The network’s most noticeable operational setback has been in Iraq, where it has suffered a backlash among the Sunni tribes that were previously its most vociferous supporters. This is partly because of US action – the “surge” in troop numbers that put more pressure on the group – and partly the result of payments to buy the support of tribal leaders. But it also appears to represent, at least in part, a rejection of the hardline and murderous rule of al-Qaeda in the areas where it once held sway. The group has also been undermined, say some analysts, by infighting for resources. Beyond that, western officials say there is little evidence – yet – of so-called “blowback” from battle-hardened fighters in Iraq returning to Europe, although one alleged British plot may have an Iraq link. (Emphasis added.)

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There is much more.

The importance of al Qaeda;s loss in Iraq cannot be overstated. Which raises the point of just how disastrously wrong Barack Obama's judgment was on Iraq last year when he opposed the surge and wanted to retreat. The man should not be a viable candidate for any office based on that wrong judgment and strategy. He should be the object of derision.

The author makes a point earlier in the piece that is worth noting. For terrorism to be a viable strategy, there must be a belief that the terrorism will continue. Al Qaeda is having a very difficult time sustaining that belief at this point. The six and a half years since a major attack on the US is a real problem for them. It is not from lack of trying, but from effective work by the US that they have failed and the Bush administration deserves credit for that.

Al Qaeda has not only declined in its ability to sustain operations against the US, it has also declined in the Muslim world. Its mass murder for Allah attacks have had the opposite of their intended consequences, outside of the Democrat party where they have been very effective. In the Muslim world, they have created a sense of revulsion that has made them a loser in the battle of ideas.