Reviewing Afghan plans

NY Times:

Deeply concerned about the prospect of failure in Afghanistan, the Bush administration and NATO have begun three top-to-bottom reviews of the entire mission, from security and counterterrorism to political consolidation and economic development, according to American and alliance officials.

The reviews are an acknowledgment of the need for greater coordination in fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, halting the rising opium production and trafficking that finances the insurgency and helping the Kabul government extend its legitimacy and control.

Taken together, these efforts reflect a growing apprehension that one of the administration’s most important legacies — the routing of Taliban and Qaeda forces in Afghanistan after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 — may slip away, according to senior administration officials.

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The administration is now committed to finding an international coordinator, described as a “super envoy,” to synchronize the full range of efforts in Afghanistan, and to continue pressing for more NATO troops to fight an insurgency that made this the most violent year since the Taliban and Al Qaeda were routed in December 2001.

“We are looking for ways to gain greater strategic coherence,” said a senior administration official involved in the review process.

One assessment is being conducted within the United States military. Adm. William J. Fallon, commander of American forces in the Middle East, has ordered a full review of the mission, including the covert hunt for Taliban and Qaeda leaders.

“It’s an assessment of our current strategy and how we are doing,” said a senior military officer. “It’s looking at whether we’ve done enough or need to do more in terms of expanding governance and economic development, as well as wrestling with the difficult security issues that we have been dealing with in Afghanistan.”

Senior State Department officials also said that R. Nicholas Burns, the under secretary of state for political affairs, was coordinating another internal assessment of diplomatic efforts and economic aid — the sorts of “soft power” assistance beyond combat force that officials agree are required for success.

A third review, one that has previously been part of the public discussion, involves the strategy of NATO, which last year assumed control of the security operation in Afghanistan and has since been criticized by American officials and lawmakers for not being aggressive enough.

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There should be a fourth study to look at the mistakes of the Clinton administration in cutting the military and the mistake of the Bush administration in not rebuilding it after 9-11. It is also time to acknowledge that the small footprint strategy that is still in place in Afghanistan will make the war longer and bloodier. Whenever you have to buy the same real estate more than once you have too small a force to space ratio, and price is paid in blood each time.

We don't need to worry about being defeated by the Taliban, we need to worry about denying them access to the people and the land around the people. To do that you need enough troops who can occupy that space. If we do that we will defeat the Taliban.