Contrasts in counterinsurgency

Westhawk:

This is a short story about how two countries, facing a similar problem, are dealing with the problem in two different ways. The outcome of these two approaches may thus be a revealing experiment from which future leaders in similar situations might learn.

Both countries are Moslem. Both governments are battling extremely violent, fanatical, and organized jihadist insurgencies. Both governments are receiving significant military and technical assistance from an outside country.

But the government in the first country is approaching its insurgency problem with indecision, contradictory orders, and a muddled doctrine. By contrast, the second country’s government seems eager to escalate the violence and bombardment of its capital city in an effort to achieve a crushing result against the insurgency it faces.

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After describing the situation in Baghdad he moves on to Mogadishu.

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Now the view from Mogadishu, where Somalia’s new prime minister had this advice to the city’s residents:

But Somalia’s government seems to be in no mood to stop the fighting. Ali Mohamed Gedi, the transitional prime minister, warned Mogadishu’s residents, thought to number around two million before the recent clashes, to clear out of the city because there was no cease-fire in sight.

“Until the terrorists are wiped out from Somalia, the fighting will go on,” Mr. Gedi said in a radio interview broadcast this weekend. “The battle is clearly between terrorists linked to Al Qaeda and the government supported by Ethiopian and [African Union] troops.”

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This description of Mogadishu sounds horrifying. On the other hand, Iraq would count itself lucky if its death toll was 200 in the last week and 1,000 in the past month. Iraq’s much higher death rate results from Al Qaeda and ex-Baathists ranging relatively freely over Baghdad and central Iraq. Four years of precise, intelligence-driven, “retail-style” counter-terrorism tactics have had no effect on the jihadists’ ability to conduct terror operations in central Iraq.

The casualties and human suffering in Mogadishu are frightening. But at least those casualties and human displacements are the result of an attempt to achieve a decisive outcome against the jihadists. If successful, the government’s campaign will result in a decision and then an end to the conflict.

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In both cases you have an enemy that camouflages himself as a civilian. If the Mogadishu approach works it creates a free fire zone where anyone not in uniform will probably be a target. It makes it harder for the enemy to swim in the sea of the people.