Saudis could not sustain regional war in Iraq

Westhawk:

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... if the Saudi government did decide to intervene, how would it do so? We are skeptical that the Saudi armed forces possess the logistic and sustainment capacity to maintain a useful military expedition in either al-Anbar province or the Baghdad area. What about a clandestine service or special operations action, supporting the Baathists and former Iraqi army officers continuing to hold out in al-Anbar province? We wonder what marginal war-winning contribution a hypothetical Saudi covert effort would add. The Sunni insurgency does not lack for cash or weapons.

What it does lack is any demographic hope against the combined Shi’ite/Kurdish population inside Iraq. The Sunni Arab population in Iraq is down to perhaps 15% or so, and shrinking. They face trained, motivated, equipped, and oil-rich opponents inside Iraq. Saudi government officials have undoubtedly already thought long and hard about explicitly backing such a weak player.

In exchange for backing the side destined to lose, the Saudis would be risking too much. First, they would be angering the Shi’ite/Kurdish Iraqi government, which will be there regardless of what the Saudi government does. Why would the Saudis choose to make an enemy out of it, if they don’t have to? Second, the Saudis would be angering the U.S. government. If Mr. Bush approves the State Department’s proposal, it is because the U.S. has decided it needs to tilt to the Shi’ite/Kurdish side in Iraq. The U.S. would then be placing a bet on this government, hoping to have good relations with it, and also hoping to keep it out of Iran’s orbit. The U.S. would be most unhappy with Saudi Arabia if it messed with this plan.

Finally, Saudi Arabia would be courting open warfare with Iran. We are not convinced that Saudi Arabia is prepared for this confrontation. Both sides’ oil industries are hugely vulnerable to bombardment, a powerful incentive to avoid provocation.

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In the first Gulf War the Saudi forces were above average when compared to other Arab armies, but they had significant deficiencies. For example, they had no mine clearing plows for their tanks and wound up using some that the US acquired from Israel. While their long suit is obviously plenty of available fuel, almost all their equipment is purchased from others. In contrast, because of embargoes, Iran has to manufacture most of its equipment. In Anbar province the Sunnis are already fighting al Qaeda and not the Shia militias. The one scenario where they might intervene would be an attempted Iranian take over, in which case they would probably have plenty of allies including the US.

Update: The Belmont Club also comments on the Westhawk piece:

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The logic for crushing the Sunni insurgency is that is the fate they have chosen for themselves. The objections against it are not only moral but practical. Removing them from the board will mean that there will be no countervailing force against the Shi'ites. Colonial powers always employed the policy of "divide and rule" to pacify nations. Without the Sunnis, there is nothing to divide between. My own guess is that the key Sunni insurgency trump card is described in the phrase "The interview came at a time when Saddam's followers are taking steps to regroup and regain political influence outside Iraq,", which is AP-speak for they are looking for someone to save their hide. One way to understand SCRI leader Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim's aversion to a "regional solution" to Iraqi problems is that he wants none of that nonsense. The Sunnis are on the ropes. He doesn't want anyone ringing the bell. He wants the full count.

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One of the greatest pieces of disinformation that the press ever sold the public was this notion that the Sunni insurgency was on the verge of defeating American forces in Iraq. This idea has made it difficult for much of the public to understand the dynamic of the fight and it represents a failure of narrative which is only latterly being corrected.

I am not sure it is being corrected. when you see pieces about wishful thinking in the Bush White House without a bit of irony concerning the defeat of the Sunnis, the truth still has not conquered the left's narrative.