Troop debate continues

Washington Post:

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"Without additional combat forces, we will not win this war," McCain said, describing inadequate U.S. troop numbers to clear insurgent strongholds, stem sectarian violence and train Iraqi security forces. "We need to do all these things if we are to succeed. And we will need more troops to do them."

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On Wednesday, Gen. John P. Abizaid, who leads the U.S. Central Command, testified on Capitol Hill that he believes sending in a large contingent of infantry troops would be a mistake, in part because it could dissuade Iraqi troops from taking the lead in security operations. Abizaid said he plans over coming months to introduce a more robust training effort -- involving additional U.S. trainers and advisers to help boost the numbers and capabilities of Iraqi forces -- so Iraq can defend its homeland and thus transition toward a U.S. exit.

"It's easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work," Abizaid said. "I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future."

About 140,000 U.S. troops are in Iraq, many stationed in the areas around Baghdad where violence has been most severe. Military officials said yesterday that a boost of 20,000 infantry troops -- five or six brigades -- would do little to change the nature of the insurgency or the sectarian strife and that commanders are not considering such a move.

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Under the troop-to-population ratios used in historical counterinsurgency campaigns, some of which had aspects of civil wars, the United States and its allies in Iraq would need at least 500,000 and perhaps more than 1 million troops, military experts say. No one thinks those numbers will be available anytime soon, even if the training of Iraqis is greatly expanded and accelerated.

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Actually they are pretty close to that level now when you count combined Iraqi and US forces. One of the problems now is the uneven quality of Iraqi forces and where they are stationed. Too many of them do not want to operate outside their neighborhoods. They are more of a militia than an army. That is one reason that Anbar province is so undermanned by the Iraqis. There are some studies that suggest that the extra 20,000 troops that McCain suggest could make a difference. Examples are given of the drop in violence when we raised the force levels for the elections. However those were special circumstances that made it difficult for the enemy to push his objectives.

The enemy has to rely on ambiguity as to time and place for his attacks. During the elections both of those were finite and thus easier to defend against. The enemy is incapable of mounting a successful attack against defended positions so he had to largely back off. His mobility was further restricted by a curfew for motor vehicles during the elections.

As a general rule the force to space ration needed goes up in urban areas, but it is also mistake to rely on a force to population ratio. The military made a bigger mistake in Vietnam by using a force to force ratio which gave the determination of troop levels to our enemies. Space is the critical element. If you control the real estate you can control the enemy's movement. In an insurgency it is his movement that is critical to control. Without movement he cannot win.