The joint chiefs look for a new plan too

The Adventures of Chester:

All of a sudden, everyone's got an Iraq plan. The Small Wars Journal excerpts a subscription-only article from Inside the Pentagon:

A small group of officers assembled by Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to draw up alternatives to the U.S. military strategy in Iraq is expected to conclude its work in December, according to defense sources. Some observers anticipate the recommendations will call for a dramatic change of course in the Persian Gulf nation and perhaps in the war on terrorism more broadly...

The Joint Staff review is being carried out in extraordinary secrecy. A spokesman for Pace said this week the group has no formal name but its role is “to assess what’s working and what’s not working” in Iraq and beyond. The spokesman did not respond by press time (Nov. 8) to a number of follow-up questions posed by a reporter.

Pace’s exploration of Iraq alternatives comes as a congressionally mandated study group, co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), is conducting an independent review of the strategy to combat the insurgency and sectarian violence in the war-torn nation.

Some experts speculate the Marine Corps general decided to convene his own panel to develop new alternatives for Iraq in case the Baker-Hamilton “Iraq Study Group” offers recommendations the military or the Bush administration find unacceptable...

Participants include Army Col. H.R. McMaster, who until earlier this year commanded a cavalry regiment that pacified the Iraqi insurgent stronghold of Tall Afar, though violence has since returned to that town. Another team member is Army Col. Peter Mansoor, who directs an Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency school at Fort Leavenworth, KS. The Marine Corps reportedly has sent Col. Thomas Greenwood, director of the Marine Command and Staff College, and the other services are represented on the study team, as well.

The Joint Staff strategy review kicked off in late September and was originally slated to last 60 days, though it now appears work will continue into December, according to officials familiar with the group who are not authorized to speak for it...

It's the secret group to develop a backup plan in case the president doesn't like the public group's plan. Or, the secret group, being close to the top, has maybe already gotten wind of the public group's plan and decided it's awful . . .

...

Chester also has a discussion of plans to take out Sadr.

We have already missed the opportunity to take out Sadr unless he is dumb enough to get into a direct engagement with our forces. Recall that in recent weeks we have had to release some of his command structure that were captured because the Iraqi government said to. To kill Sadr now would be to ignore Iraqi sovereignty, which we have spent so much effort to put in place. This is not to say that he and his organization do not need to be destroyed. They do, but we do not have the flexibility we had 18 months ago. The Iraqi government could be given an ultimatum of destroying and disarming his militia or we will pull out. It will take something like that at this point.

As for additional troops, the current plan is to add additional Iraqi troops. That is more of a long term effort and perhaps adding additional US troops in the meantime might help. We have always had a force to space problem in Iraq, but Rumsfeld has not been the architect of that plan. This is Gen. Abizaid's plan that we have been executing. Perhaps the joint chiefs have some better ideas on how to proceed, but they are not in the chain of command. It could be they may want to change personnel at Centcom.

I would add that one of the Army's star players is on the joint chief panel, Col. H.R. McMaster. He devised the brilliant plan to take back Tal Afar. It is time to see if he has any ideas for the rest of the country.

Bill Roggio also looks at strategic alternatives in Iraq, and looks at Stratfor's analysis. The Belmont Club has its own commentary on Chester's excerpt. Wretchard also has an excellent commentary on the dishonesty of the "redeployment" debate of the Democrats. My own view on the "redeployment" debate is that it is as cowardly as the strategy. It is another example of the practice of the politics of fraud by Democrats. No one should fool themselves into thinking that Democrats will take responsibility for the disasters that befall us when their "redeployment" takes place.