Nuke nuts transform debate on missile defense

Peter Hussey:

The twin nuclear and missile threats from Iran and North Korea have transformed the missile defense debate. It is no longer "should we deploy," but "how should we deploy?" Policy-makers face a tough decision: How much to invest in some protection now, vs. future, complimentary technologies that offer enhanced protection?
In missile defense, as in finance, the best way to cover risks is not to "put all your eggs in one basket." Instead, assemble a "balanced, diversified portfolio" of short, medium- and long-term technologies that cover the range of risks. In missile defense, current assets are being fielded, such as the Aegis/Standard Missile-3, initially deployed as an air defense weapon, but now upgraded to be a sea-based missile defense. Another is THAAD, the Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense system capable of providing terminal missile defenses for U.S. forces in a regional conflict. And the Alaska and California-based Ground-based Interceptor system (GBI) provides an initial defense for the continental United States against long range rockets.
Each has limits. The sea-based interceptor is limited by its shipboard launch canister. THAAD will always cover a limited area. And GBI is a fixed-site system that covers chiefly Northeast Asia threats.
Future assets like the Airborne Laser (ABL) and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) offer complementary capabilities. ABL, a chemical laser mounted in a 747, requires further technological work to become operational. KEI, a very fast interceptor launched from land or sea, is a solvable engineering challenge. More futuristic capabilities, chiefly in the realm of space-based assets, require engineering successes, and, most of all, a policy commitment to extend interceptors into space.
How "far off" will depend on "when" we decide to move forward. For example, both Polaris and Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles were developed in the mid-1950s by the late Air Force Gen. Bernard Schriever in a time frame previously thought undoable. Both technologies have served us well, as the sea- and land-based legs of the U.S. nuclear triad have remained the bed rock upon which U.S. nuclear deterrence rests.

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He is right that we need defense in depth. As a part of that depth we need launch phase systems that can hit the enemy missile when it is most vulnerable as it is lifting off and before it can deploy any decoys to confuse the other systems. The other systems are there to catch what gets through the launch phase. Right now the two main adversaries of concern are North Korea and Iran, both of which are limited to primitive land based systems, which limits their ambiguity about launch sites. That makes the launch phase system particularly attractive for dealing with their threat. It would also mean that the fallout from taking out their missile will fall on their territory.