Iran's intransigence

Hillel Fradkin:

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Khomeini's vision, however, went beyond clerical rule over Iran. It asserted the wholesale rejection of liberal democracy there and everywhere in the world and a mission to ultimately destroy it. This envisaged a grand transnational alliance of radical Muslim movements. Ahmadinejad has reasserted this as well - as was made abundantly clear in his recent letter to President Bush, which asserted the decline of liberal democracy and looked forward to its demise.

In addition to this fidelity to Khomeini's legacy, Ahmadinejad has endeavored to establish himself as Khomeini's true successor, seeking a leadership role throughout the Muslim world - including in such far-away places as Indonesia, which he visited recently. He has reinforced longstanding support for Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah and sought an alliance with Hamas, the new radical rulers of the Palestinian Authority. He has laid claim to superior standing by calling for the destruction of Israel and, in general, seeking confrontation with the United States.

For all these purposes - the Iranian and the pan-Islamic - the pursuit of nuclear weaponry is indeed a "golden treasure." Actual possession of nuclear weapons would aid in the survival of the clerical regime - as the North Korean case made clear - and protect Iran's efforts to involve itself in radical endeavors elsewhere in the Muslim world; indeed, the enormous prestige of being a nuclear power would enhance the latter project.

In short, Ahmadinejad has no good reason to agree to our condition to suspend enrichment. Thus it is most unlikely that there will be negotiations on our terms.

If there are negotiations, they are likely to be among ourselves - among the United States, the Europeans, Russia and China. There may be several subjects of these negotiations, but the most crucial will be whether to drop our demand for a cessation of enrichment.

The Bush administration has insisted that this it will not do. Indeed, there is no point to any negotiations unless they achieve at a minimum an interruption of Iranian nuclear development. But at least some of our partners will be tempted to think and say otherwise and to try to persuade us to negotiate directly anyway.

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Yes they will. Appeasement is in their blood at this point.