Pre invasion manpower planning

This if from a transcript of Secretary Rumsfeld's and Gen. Pace's press briefing Tuesday. I think it pretty well knocks down the myth of "Rumsfeld insisted on too few troops." Gen. Pace is quoted:

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In the last couple of days there have been several articles, opinion pieces, editorials about the responsibility of senior U.S. military officers to speak up, to tell the truth as we know it, and that is a sacred obligation of all of us who are fortunate to represent all the members of the armed forces and to have the opportunity to participate at this level.

Let me just give you Pete Pace's rendition of how the process worked building up to Iraq. First of all, once it became apparent that we may have to take military action, the Secretary of Defense asked Tom Franks, who was the commander of Central Command, to begin doing some planning, which he did. Over the next two years, 50 or 60 times, Tom Franks either came to Washington or by video teleconference, sat down with the Secretary of Defense, sat down with the Joint Chiefs and went over what he was thinking, how he was planning. And as a result of those iterative opportunities and all the questions that were asked, not once was Tom told, "No, don't do that. No, don't do this. No, you can't have this. No, you can't have that." What happened was, in a very open roundtable discussion, questions about what might go right, what might go wrong, what would you need, how would you handle it, and that happened with the Joint Chiefs and it happened with the Secretary.

And before the final orders were given, the Joint Chiefs met in private with General Franks and assured ourselves that the plan was a solid plan and that the resources that he needed were going to be allocated. We then went and told the Secretary of Defense our belief in Tom's plan and in the resources, and I know for a fact, because I was there, that when the Joint Chiefs were called over to the White House, several of the questions that the president asked specifically were about our understanding and belief in the plan, and whether or not the amount -- proper amount of resources had been allocated. He did that both with us, just the Joint Chiefs, and then again when all the combatant commanders were in from around the globe well before a final decision was made.

We had then and have now every opportunity to speak our minds, and if we do not, shame on us because the opportunity is there.

It is elicited from us. You know, we're expected to. And the plan that was executed was developed by military officers, presented by military officers, questioned by civilians as they should, revamped by military officers, and blessed by the senior military leadership.

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Later Gen. Pace in response to a question says:

The logic for the size of the force that went in was very solid. And among other things, it included the belief that Saddam probably believed that we would take six months to build up our forces again, array 500,000 troops on the other side of the border, bomb him for 45 days and then come in.

What turned out was the reverse. We went in with a lighter force of about 150,000. We did not precede it with a long bombing campaign. We got to Baghdad much faster than anybody thought we ever would, and as a result of that, Pete Pace believes that we had much less destruction and much less loss of life to get that job done.

So from that standpoint, I was very comfortable with the prewar planning. I am comfortable with the way it was executed, and I would go back, given the same facts and figures, and reach the same conclusion, as did all the Joint Chiefs in agreement with Tom Franks' plan.

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This may not shut up the TV generals, but it should.