Lessons for false memories of Vietnam and Iraq

Richard Cohen thinks he has found some lessons from Vietnam, but in fact he has constructed some Iraq stramen. Here are comments I made on his column at Small Wars Journal:

Cohen recycles the Shinseki myth. The General served his full term before retiring.

Cohen also tries to make a comparison between McNamara and Rumsfeld which fails when faced with the facts. McNamara turned down requests for troops and Rumsfeld did not. Rumsfeld has said tht he was prepared to provide 400,000 or more troops for the Iraqi operation, but that General Franks and General Abizaid told him they did not need that many.

I am not being critical of that judgement on their part, but if you are going to criticize the decision on the number of troops, it should be focused on the General's decisions and their rational and not on some mythical restrictions by the President and Secretary of Defense who have consistently said that the troops levels are a decision made by the commanders. If you have any doubt on this, just read the Prolog to Tommy Franks' book American Soldier.

I think guys like Cohen know they could not win a debate with the generals so they keep hacking away at a strawman argument.

Having former generals second guessing those who succeeded them is nothing new. Many have made a career of it on TV. Cohen just likes Zinni et.al. because they reinforce his prejudice. There are a lot of former generals out there who probably support the decisions of Franks and Abizaid, but because of that fact their opinions are not news.

In case you are not aware of the arguments for the smaller number of troops, there are several including an offensive based on a rapid advance that disorients and overwhelms the enemy. More troops would have made this much more difficult because of the logistical support train needed for the additional troops. Winning in three weeks pretty well confirms Franks' judgement on that point. In terms of troops needed after major combat operations, Abizaid wanted to have the Iraqis take over the combat space as soon as possible. When the Iraqi Army disintegrated during the war, rebuilding became a major task, with several blips along the way. However, the new Iraqi Army is taking shape and taking over much of the battle space and is giving the force to space ratio needed to make the insurgency less effective.

There is obviously more to it than I can summarize in this space, but if you read Franks book you will not regret it.

Another commentor questioned my sources prompting this response:

Please read the Prolog to General Franks' American Soldier. It is not even arguable. I would also add that General Pace confirmed the issue on troops levels in a press briefing today. Trainor may be relying too much on his NY Times co author. His assertions are clearly refuted by the statements of Franks and his component commanders. If you get further into the book, Franks lays out his reasons for his requested force levels. At no time does he suggest that he got less than what he asked for.

I would add that even Sen. Kerry backed off the Shinseki myth when reporters confronted him with the facts during the 2004 campaign.

BTW, the Trainor book also seriously misstates the events surrounding the flap over Gen. Wallace's purported statements concerning whether there was adequate wargaming on dealing with the Fedayeen. They also overlook the rather clever way the Centcom staff found to deal with the Fedayeen. I base this last comment on the excerpt of the book I saw in the NY Times that dealt with that kerfufle.

The persistence of the Shinseki myth and the "Rumsfeld would not give us enough troops" myth is unfortunate because it clouds the debate on what decisions were made with regard to troops and why.