The latest massacre myths in Iraq

J.R. Dunn:

...

The Baghdad story broke down even more quickly. First, there was that kidnaping victim, who stated flatly that the place was no mosque. The Iraqi commander (a Muslim, and unlikely to assault a mosque) said the same thing. Skepticism was further confirmed by the fact that the individuals peddling the mosque story were associated with Moqtada al-Sadr, whose every last effort eventually collapses into comedy, often of an extremely black variety. If Arabs were still in the habit of bestowing sobriquets on their notables, Sadr would be known as “Moqtada the Inept.”

The purpose of these fabrications (along with yet another case from the Ishaqi area – an accusation that U.S. troops had killed a family of three at Duluiya – [the incident actually involved seven Al-Queda who attacked a patrol with grenades]) isn’t difficult to work out. The Jihadis are at the end of their rope. Their hole card, a civil war triggered by the destruction of Samarra’s Golden Temple, fizzled in the face of Iraqi resolution. They have little left in the way of resources; as Lt. Col. Joseph Myers reported here recently, they havefailed at creating anything resembling a Tet offensive. So instead, they’re attempting something else – sticking with the Vietnam paradigm, they’re trying to create a My Lai. The My Lai Model

My Lai was the Vietnam War incident that finally destroyed public support for the conflict. A village complex in Quang Ngai Province, My Lai was widely known to be sympathetic to the Vietcong. On March 16, 1968 a patrol of the Americal Division led by Lt. William Calley entered the subvillage of My Lai 4, and for reasons never made entirely clear, began massacring the villagers. A large number – estimates range from 347 to 504—were killed under the most atrocious circumstances imaginable.

...

But the Iraqi Jihadis are nothing if not resourceful. If U.S. troops will not cooperate, then they’ll arrange for their own atrocities, with the help of a corrupt police force and a media avid for scandal. (To give the media as much credit as it deserves, it doesn’t appear to have fallen very hard for either of these stories – simply reported them without much in the way of hysteria or arm-waving, and duly followed up with the disclaimers. Reporters must have been suspicious from the start.)

A lot of unanswered questions exist about these incidents. Where did all those other bodies come from? (Did the Jihadis – and the militia – actually murder people to bolster these hoaxes? Anything is possible, with these types.) How deeply were the local police involved? Are they in league with the insurgents? How long can Sadr keep getting away with it?

But one thing we can be sure of: this time it didn’t work. In the same way that all the other Jihadi tricks have failed to work: mowing down children, attacking hospitals and mosques, targeting police and army recruits, assassinating respected sheiks, destroying ancient shrines…. Like many of these crimes, the latest Jihadi gimmick has all the earmarks of a desperation move. And that’s a very good sign for the future of Iraq.