The failure of the Generals' offensive

In an email to Real Clear Politics a Lt. Col. gives his perspective on Secretary Rumsfeld:

I would beg to differ with that assessment by Mr. Ignatius. I am a combat arms officer, a combat veteran of the Global War on Terror, currently serving on the faculty of one of the Staff Colleges.

My assessment from extensive and continuous contact with young field grade officers, most of which are combat arms branch, combat veterans, is that Secretary Rumsfeld is considered the finest Secretary of Defense of the last forty years. This is in addition to my "peer group", of which many of us maintain contact with each each other regardless if we are in CONUS or SW Asia.

Maybe Mr. Ignatius has limited his conversations to Officers assigned in the Beltway. Yes, "beltway types" unfortunatly also exist in the military.

However, I can tell you that beyond the Beltway in dusty and dirty places like Ft. Benning, Ft. Stewart, Ft. Hood, Ft. Campbell and Ft. Bragg, where officers wear BDUs instead of Class Bs that there are tens of thousands of Officers, Commissioned/Warrant/Non-Commissioned, that would go to hell and back for this Secretary.

He pushes us to what we "think" is our limit, then shows us we have another ten percent to give. Secretary Rumsfelds nickname among many is the "110% Secretary." Former Secretary Cohen, a good man whom I respected, would have been considered the "90% Secretary" as he never was able to get us to give "all."

And it is not just the rest of the officer corp pushing back. Andrew Bacewich, a professor at Boston University writes:

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BUT IN THEIR eagerness to settle scores, Rumsfeld's pursuers are flirting with ideas that can only be regarded as subversive. Newbold, for one, has resurrected the notion that a senior officer's primary obligation lies not to those atop the chain of command but to the Constitution.

This theory last surfaced during the Korean War, when Gen. Douglas MacArthur publicly derided the proposition that soldiers "owe primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch." In citing a higher allegiance, MacArthur was attempting to justify the flagrant insubordination that had cost him his job. Wrong in 1951, MacArthur's theory is equally wrong today. To grant even the most narrowly drawn exceptions to the principle of civilian control is to open up a Pandora's box of complications.

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While some on the left might think the generals' revolt useful politically, that is short sighted thinking. An unscientific poll by Neal Boortz showed 90 percent supporting Rumsfeld.

As this post points out, the Generals who were actually responsible for the decisions in the liberation of Iraq find no merit in their gripes.

I think Bacewich and ultimately the intellectuals on the left see more danger in a generals' coup than they do in Rumsfeld's continued service. Bacewich does apparently buy into the Shinseki myth, i.e. he was unfairly dismissed because his advice went against policy, however he does note that Shinseki has had the grace to keep his opinion to himself on the matter. The reality is that Shinseki served his full term and was not dismissed. His term on the Joint Chiefs was not without controversy, including his "beret" policy that resulted in thousands of black berets being purchased from the Chicoms.

Jack Kelly has a pretty complete trascript of "Rifle" DeLongs interview on CNN.

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M. O'BRIEN: General, to sum it up. If I had to sum up the criticism it seems to me what people are saying is there's an arrogance and almost a cavalier nature of the way this war has -- was thought out initially. And as a result what that really did was, more than anything else, put not enough troops on the ground. Would you go along with that?

DELONG: No, I disagree. If we could have gotten more troops on the ground, we would have, but we couldn't come through turkey. We had one small hole to get through. That was up through Kuwait. And we got as many troops on the ground as fast as we could.

If you remember, our tactics in this war was to get to Baghdad as soon as possible, to keep the Republican Party from getting buried inside the built-up area of the buildings. So getting there quickly with the right force was the right thing to do.

Would it have been helpful to have more forces later in retrospect, 20/20? Probably. Would it have been better to have more military police because of the looting, which we didn't expect to happen? We didn't expect the police force there to quit the day before we came in. We didn't expect Saddam to...

M. O'BRIEN: Final thought, is Secretary Rumsfeld arrogant?

DELONG: I don't know if I'd use the word "arrogant." He's very sure of himself. And if you're not sure of himself(sic), I guess you may consider him arrogant. But if you walk (in there) and know what you're talking about, you can have a very pleasant, professional conversation with the man.

This rings true to me. I have found that it can be very satisfying to work for a boss who challenges you to think and defend the positions you are taking.

It makes the Batiste criticism even more strange since he admitedly turned down a promotion to retire. Obviously, he either was not "punished" for having a contrary position on policy, or he was not willing to express his positions and defend them. If the latter, it does not say much for his courage and grace under pressure.

Some have argued that the problem is group think. I think that Rifle DeLong points out something else.

Gateway Pundit has more on the counter offensive.

Update: The NY Times also speaks out on the importance of civilian control of the military.

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The idea that civilian leaders, as representatives of the people, should have the ultimate say in how the country's military power is wielded dates to colonial resentment of British rule and is embedded in the Constitution.

Tensions between civilian leaders and the military brass are routine and occasionally erupt into public view. But the principle of civilian supremacy has never been seriously challenged; the last plotters of a military coup d'état in American history were disgruntled officers faced down by General George Washington at Newburgh, N.Y., in 1783.

In fact, Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice prescribes court martial for any commissioned officer who "uses contemptuous words against the president, the vice president, Congress, the secretary of defense" or other federal or state officials.

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The Zinni rebellion appears to be in full retreat at this point.