Don't expect rational actions in Iran

Ralph Peters:

THE most dangerous error we could make in our sharpening confrontation with Iran is to convince ourselves that its leaders will act rationally. Few wars are rooted in dispassionate analysis. Self-delusion sparks most such catastrophes.

The power brokers in Tehran may be on the verge of misjudging America's will and resources as profoundly as did the Japanese on Dec. 7, 1941, or al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001.

Stalin misread America's will when he acquiesced in the Korean Communist invasion of the south. So did Castro, when he imagined that he could impose a tyrannical regime on Grenada.

Saddam Hussein misread America, too. Twice. First, when he convinced himself that he could grab Kuwait with impunity, and, second, when he did his weapons-of-mass-destruction fan dance. (Bulletin for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad: Don't play the I've-got-weapons-you'd-better-be-afraid-of card.)

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The crucial question is whether the Iranians are still playing at brinksmanship, hoping to spook us into passivity as they build nuclear weapons, or if they've already convinced themselves that a conflict with the United States is inevitable.

Given the closed nature of Iran's ruling clique, it's impossible to know. The most-probable situation is that differing factions within the leadership are at different stages of willingness for war, with some ready to fight and others fearful. Cooler heads may prevail - but "cooler heads" is a relative term in Tehran.

Have the inner-circle Iranian leaders replicated yesteryear's decision-making process of Osama bin Laden and his deputies in their Afghan camps - a hothouse atmosphere in which limited evidence was processed selectively and mutual-enablers convinced each other that a few attacks on American landmarks would drive Washington into a global retreat?

Have the Iranians failed to understand the real implications of 9/11? Do they believe that sinking a few oil tankers or even a U.S. Navy ship or two would drive us from the region? Has flawed, impassioned faith led to faulty geo-strategic calculations?

The most worrisome possibility is that they may have convinced themselves they can win.

FROM the Iranian perspec tive, it may appear that we're fully committed militarily - and they've probably wildly over-estimated the "anti-war" constituency in the U.S. Tehran certainly evidences no understanding of the depths of America's military resources, of our decision-making processes - or of NASCAR America's inevitable reaction to attacks on our Navy (or on the fuel supplies for our SUVs).

Whether or not President Ahmadinejad is a madman, he speaks like one. He has no past experience of global statecraft and no grasp of the different mental and moral structures of other civilizations. The extent to which his ability to calculate objectively has been suppressed by a psychological addiction to religious extremism remains an open question. But the portents look bleak.

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SHOULD Tehran ignite a combat exchange, we need to ensure not only that Iran's nuclear-weapons program is crippled, but that its broader capabilities are shattered.

Militarily, it will be time for our Air Force to prove its worth, with the Navy in support. Iran's recent experience of conflict is of attrition-based land warfare. But there's no need for us to employ conventional ground forces inside Iran (special operations troops are another matter). We'll have to watch the Iraqi and Afghan borders, but our fight would be waged from the air and from the sea.

If we're pulled into war, we need to strike hard and fast - before Iran's allies can make mischief in international forums. We should destroy as much of Tehran's nuclear infrastructure as possible, eliminate its air force and air defenses and wreck its naval facilities beyond repair - no matter the collateral damage. The madmen in Tehran must pay an unbearable price.

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